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IN THE S.UPREME CO~URT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VERA M. STOUT, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
WASHINGTON FIRE AND MARINE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a 
corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
9873 
RES.PONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to recover for the value of un-
scheduled personal property due to destruction by 
fire under a policy of insurance issued by the 
defendant. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial Judge granted a Summary Judgment 
in favor of plaintiff. The parties submitted to the 
court the question of whether the defendant was 
obligated under the terms of the policy to pay the 
value of the destroyed unscheduled personal property. 
The question was submitted upon a Stipulation of 
Facts and Briefs. Plaintiff-Respondent seeks affirm-
ance of the judgment by the Trial Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff lives at 842 East 4500 South Street 
in Salt Lake City, Utah. The lot on which her home 
and other buildings are located is approximately 92 
feet wide and 471 feet deep. The building used as the 
home is located towards the front of the lot. Approx-
imately 25 feet behind the home was the building 
that was destroyed by fire. 
On August 2, 1961, the building situated to the 
rear of· plaintiff's home was completely destroyed 
by fire, including all of the contents therein. This 
building was used by the plaintiff as a tire recapping 
shop and the plaintiff also used a part of the building 
as a storage shed in which she kept the unscheduled 
personal property that was destroyed in the fire and 
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for which she. seeks to recover the value of said 
property. 
The sole issue of law to be determined herein is 
whether the parties meant by the word "premises" 
as used in the policy of insurance, the lot and all of 
the buildings thereon or whether the word "premises" 
should be defined to mean only the building used 
as a dwelling. 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I 
THE MEANING AND INTENT OF THE 
WORD "PREMISES" AS USED IN THE 
POLICY OF INSURANCE SHOULD, IF POSSI-
BLE, BE DETERMINED FROM THE POLICY 
ITSELF. 
Any doubts or uncertainties as to the effect of the 
policy of insurance or to its meaning are to be con-
strued so as to resolve said doubts or uncertainties 
against the defendant in as much as that company 
prepared and issued the policy. Commercial Credit 
Corporation vs. Premier Insurance Company, 12 
Utah 2d 321. 
The policy of insurance under general conditions 
defines the word "premises" as follows: 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"The unqualified word "premises" means the 
premises described in the declaration includ-
ing grounds, garages, stables and other out 
buildings incidental thereto and private ap-
proaches thereto." 
In attempting to determine the meaning and scope 
of the word "premises," all of the facts and the nature 
of the claim should be given consideration. For 
example a building on the premises used as a business 
would not be incidental to the use of the property as 
a dwelling. However, a part of that same building 
used for storage of household effects and property of 
a personal nature would be incidental to the use of 
the property as a dwelling. Therefore, there is no 
question but what a claim for damage to the building 
as an appurtenant structure would not be covered. 
There is no attempt in this case to make any claim 
for damage to the building. The claim is for personal 
property stored in the building. It also must be 
remembered that the personal property was not 
property used in the business but property incidental 
to a dwelling, such as gardening equipment, camping 
equipment, outdoor furniture, bicycles, equipment 
for horse back riding, etc. The appellant seems to 
be taking the position that the law in this case should 
be the same as if a claim were made for the damage 
to the building used as a business. The cases cited 
in Appelant's Brief are to this effect. 
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The appellant admits that the tire recapping 
building was on the premises, (page 5 and 6 of his 
Brief), but attempts to avoid liability by quoting the 
policy as follows: 
"The described building is not seasonal and no 
business pursuits are conducted at the premises 
thereof, exceptions if any. (no exceptions 
noted).'' 
However, it must be remembered that the insurance 
agent of the insurer, or the insurer, prepared and 
filled out the policy. Further, the same insurance 
agent wrote a policy of insurance on the tire recap-
ping shop but did not place said insurance with this 
company. 
It was never intended by the insured that 
premises should refer only to the building used as a 
dwelling. The policy provides under Perils Insured 
Against in reference to wind storm or hail "personal 
property kept in building ( s)" using the word build-
ings in the plural form. The plural form of "build-
ings" is used in Section 5 in two different places 
referring to damage caused to personal property by 
steam or hot water heating systems. The plural form 
is again used in regards to Section 12, Falling Objects. 
Excluding loss to personal property by falling objects 
unless the buildings containing the property shall 
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first sustain damage. The plural form "building(s)" 
is used in Section 13, Section 14, Section 15, Section 
16, and Section 17. It is to be noted that Section t 4 
provideds for coverage for outdoor equipment as a 
direct result of the collapse of a building. Under 
extensions of coverage, Section 3, Consequential Loss, 
the policy provides for coverage to unscheduled per-
sonal property while contained in a building at the 
described location. There is no indication that the 
building must be a dwelling. Under "Special Limits 
of Liability," Section 1, provides for a loss deductable 
of $50.00 to personal property "in the open." Section 
2 is identical. Section 3 provides that "this company 
shall not be liable in any one loss with respect to the 
following named property: (E) for more than 
$500.00 on water craft including their trailers 
whether licensed or not, furnishings, equipment and 
outboard motors, nor for any loss by wind storm or 
hail to such property not inside fully enclosed build-
ings. (Except row boats and canoes on the premises.)" 
It is to be noted that row boats and canoes on the 
premises are fully covered without the limitation of 
$500.00. 
From the foregoing it is obvious that the insured 
meant to insure all of the personal property of the 
insured while on the total area of the lot or in any 
one of the buildings located on the lot. There are 
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items of personal property specifically covered that 
are not reasonably kept in the dwelling, such as the 
outdoor equipment specifically mentioned in Section 
14, the water craft including their trailers and row 
boats and canoes. 
One can well imagine appellant's dilemma in the 
present case. It is difficult to sustain the argument 
that the tire recapping shop was not on the premises 
in view of the definition of "premises" in the policy. 
The other alternative for the appellant is to argue 
that the personal property is not covered if stored in 
a place where business is conducted. The appellant 
has tried to solve this dilemma by arguing that if a 
building is used for one purpose, such as a garage, it 
·would be on the premises, but if converted to a 
business use it would not be on the premises. This 
is illogical and it is submitted that if a building is on 
the premises for one purpose it is also on the premises 
for any other purpose. 
This policy of insurance is in two sections. Sec-
tion 1 refers to coverage on the dwelling, appurtenant 
private structures, unscheduled personal property 
and additional living expense. Section 2 coverage in-
cludes comprehensive personal liability, medical pay-
ments, and physical damage to property of others. 
Under the section on Provisions Applicable to Section 
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2 coverage, the policy very clearly excludes coverage 
from business property. The policy then further 
describes business property as property on which the 
business is conducted. 
The above exclusion refers only to coverage for 
comprehensive personal liability and does not apply 
to Section 1 coverage of the policy which is un-
scheduled personal property and it is submitted that 
if the insurer had intended to exclude personal prop-
erty from coverage while located on business property 
he would have done so. There is nothing in the policy 
in regards to unscheduled personal property that ex-
cludes coverage for said property while located on 
business property. 
In view of the great detail with which all of the 
exclusions in the policy are spelled out (there are 
perhaps a hundred exclusions in regards to coverage 
on unscheduled personal property), it seems incred-
ible that the insurer would have entirely overlooked 
or omitted such a substantial exclusion from the 
policy if it had intended that there should be no 
coverage on unscheduled personal property if located 
on business property. Huber and Rollin Construction 
Company v. City of South Salt Lake, 7 Utah 2d 273. 
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PoiNT II 
THE WORD "PREMISES" SHOULD BE 
GIVEN ITS USUAL OR NORMAL MEANING. 
In determining the intent of the policy the test 
to be applied is would the meaning be plain to a 
person of ordinary intelligence and understanding 
viewing the matter fairly and reasonably in accord-
ance with the usual and natural meaning of the words 
and in the light of the existing circumstances includ-
ing the purposes of the policy. Auto Lease Company 
vs. Central Mutual Insurance Company, 7 Utah 2d 
336. 
The wording of the policy in regards to un-
scheduled personal property states: 
"On premises this policy covers unscheduled 
personal property usual or incidental to the 
occupancy of the premises or dwelling, owned, 
worn or used by an insured while on the 
premises.'' 
Premises is defined in Websters dictionary as 
follows: 
"The property conveyed in a deed; hence 
in general, a piece of land or of real estate; 
sometimes, especially in fire insurance papers, 
a building or buildings on land." Websters 
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New International Dictionary, Second Edition, 
1946. 
This Mississippi Supreme Court has defined the 
word "premises" as follows: 
"The word "premises" has varying meanings, 
usually determined by the context, and when 
used with respect to property means land, 
tenaments and appurtenancies." Rignall vs. 
State, 98 So. 444, 134 Miss. 169. 
An Oklahoma case states the following: 
"House, home or premises includes the cur-
tilage surrounding a dwelling home, the area 
of land surrounding a house and actually or 
by legal construction forming one enclosure 
with it." Ratzell vs. State Okl., 228 P 166. 
Under a Will giving a wife six months to vacate 
the premises, it was held premises to mean, "a 
distinct portion. of real estate, land or lands, land with 
its appurtenances as buildings,-a building and its 
adjucts." Ruble vs. Ruble, Texas, 264, S. W. 1018. 
The word "premises when used with reference to 
conveyances "in common parlance is used to signify 
lands with their appurtenances." F. F. Proctor Troy 
Properties Co. vs. Dugan Store 181 N.Y. S. 786. 
Where lease is of premise, "premises" generally 
10 
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means land and buildings thereon. Bachenheiner vs. 
Plam Spring Management Corp., 116 C. A. 2d 580, 
254 P2d 153. 
In an action on a fire insurance policy covering 
a lumber yard and its contents, wherein there was 
number of buildings and piles of stock, all within a 
common enclosure, and also a lot across the street 
disconnected from the main yard, the main yard, 
with the property therein was held to be the premises, 
and the lot across the street held to be separate 
premises. Mangold vs. American Insurance Company 
of Newark. 99 Neb. 656, 157 N. W. 632. 
In a suit on a fire insurance policy, which de-
fendant alleged insured has breached by failing to 
keep a set of books containing a record of the property 
on the premises, held, insured did keep requisite 
books, "premises includes not only buildings, but 
land upon which they are situate." Merchants and 
Manufactures Lloyds Insurance Exchange vs. South-
ern Trading Company of Texas, Texas, 204 S. W. 352. 
11 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the decision in 
this case must be determined from a careful examina-
tion of the policy. Any doubts as to the meaning of 
the policy should be resolved against the insurer and 
the purpose of the policy should be considered. The 
words used in the policy should be given their usual 
or natural meaning. 
An examination of the policy will conclusively 
show that personal property was intended to be 
covered while on the premises. Further, "premises" 
was intended to include the total area of the lot and 
all the buildings thereon. The natural and normal 
meaning of "premises" is an enclosure or unit of 
property and all the buildings thereon. The policy 
provides for coverage to outdoor equipment, boats 
and trailers while on the premises. Obviously, the 
insurer did not intend to limit coverage to these 
items while in the dwelling only. 
The fact that the destroyed personal property was 
kept in a place of business is immaterial as long as 
the place of business is on the premises. There is no 
exclusion on personal property because it is stored in 
a place of business. Part of the policy, not applicable 
to personal property, provides for an exclusion in re-
12 
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gards to a part of the premises on which a business 
is conducted. It is therefore reasonable to assume 
that if the insurer had intended to exclude coverage 
on personal property stored in a place of business 
he would have done so. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BARTON AND KLEMM 
Attorneys for Respondent 
304 El Paso N atl. Gas Bldg. 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
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